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Abstract A growing literature has appeared in the last 2 decades with the aim to
explore if the way in which publicly funded private schools are managed (a very
autonomous mode) is more effective, than that applied in public schools (where deci-
sions are highly centralized), concerning the promotion of student’s educational skills.
Our paper contributes to this literature providing new evidence from the Spanish
experience. To this end, we use the Spanish Assessment named “Evaluación de Diag-
nóstico,” a national yearly standardized test given to students in the fourth grade and
administered by the Regional Educational Authorities. In particular, our data are those
corresponding to the assessment conducted in the Spanish region of Aragón in 2010.
Our methodological strategy is defined by the sequential application of two methods:
propensity score matching and hierarchical linear models. Additionally, the sensitivity
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of our estimates is also tested with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. Our results
underline the existence of a slight advantage of the private management model of
schools in the promotion of scientific abilities of students and in the acquisition of
foreign language (English) skills.
Keywords School choice · Propensity score matching · Hierarchical linear models ·
Unobservable variables bias · Science and Foreign Language (English) skills ·
Primary schools
JEL Classification I21 · I29
1 Introduction
Studies devoted to evaluating the impact of educational interventions have expanded
notably worldwide over the last 2 decades. There are two factors explaining this: on
the one hand, the availability of new, high quality, national and international data;
on the other, the development of innovative and sophisticated econometric methods
capable of confronting the principal methodological problems facing these studies.
These factors have created new opportunities for academics worldwide to conduct
research that addresses policymakers’ concerns about the consequences of actions
directed at improving educational outcomes (Murname and Willett 2011).
One of the interventions that has focused the empirical work of many educational
economists has been the public funding of private schools. This policy has been
widely applied under different guises worldwide (vouchers, charter schools, state-
funded private schools, free schools, academies, educational agreements between local
authorities and private schools, etc.).1 Of all these alternatives, the Spanish policy in the
compulsory education level (primary and secondary schools) consists of educational
agreements (called conciertos) between the regional educational authorities and some
private schools. Under them, authorities pay to these private schools all the school
operating cost. In return, they are subject to the same Schools Admissions Code as all
other public schools and are impeded from charging any fees to families. However,
these private schools are self-governing.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of the self-governing model
applied by the Spanish publicly funded private schools (versus that applied by the state
funded and run schools) in the development of the educational skills of children in
the fourth grade.2 Research into this topic is extremely important in Spain, where two
1 Recent reviews of these educational policies can be found in the Handbook of the Economics of Education
(Bettinger 2011; Epple et al. 2016; Urquiola 2016).
2 For the sake of simplicity, hereinafter we will refer to the publicly funded privately run schools simply
as private schools, except when necessary to differentiate from completely private independent schools.
Namely, in this paper a private school is understood as a type of publicly funded but self-governed school.
Similarly, we will refer to state funded and run schools as public schools. The main difference between them
lies mainly in the way they are administered, being private schools much more autonomous concerning the
process and personnel decisions (deciding on the purchase of supplies and on budget allocations within
schools, hiring and rewarding teachers, choosing textbooks, instructional methods, and the like).
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models of school management (public and private) coexist and compete for limited
public resources.
Our paper fits into a wide literature that originates with Coleman et al. (1982)
who found that private Catholic schools in the USA were more effective than pub-
lic schools in the promotion of the scores obtained by pupils in standardized tests
on basic cognitive skills (reading, writing and mathematics). These authors applied
multiple regression analysis with a set of carefully selected variables, arguing that
controlling for important preexisting differences between students attending public
and private schools allowed them to overcome the selection bias that threatened their
estimations.3 However, subsequent methodological advances have made clear that
Coleman’s empirical strategy does not permit to obtain the causal effect of attending
to a private school.
On this basis, a considerable number of empirical studies, involved in the evalua-
tion of the impact of private schools on student achievement, have emerged in recent
decades using different empirical strategies (random assignment, instrumental vari-
ables, regression, matching techniques or differences in differences). Nevertheless,
the results of this literature are so far inconclusive.
While a number of studies in various settings find that private schools outperform
public ones (for instance, Kim 2011; Crespo and Santín 2014), other research has found
that student performance is not different, in terms of statistical significance, between
private and public schools (Chudgar and Quin 2012, among others). In addition, there
exists other studies which have concluded that private schools perform worse than
public ones (Mancebón et al. 2012, among others).
In some papers, the effect encountered varies depending on the specific evaluated
outcomes (Zimmer et al. 2012; Davies 2013), academic level of students (Gronberg
and Jansen 2001) or methodological approach (Davies 2013). To these studies must be
added those which have shown that the effects of school type vary over time (Hanushek
et al. 2007) and those which fail to find a consistently positive (or negative) effect of
state-funded Catholic schools on overall area-wide educational performance (Allen
and Vignoles 2015).
To summarize, technical studies comparing the performance of publicly and pri-
vately run schools are thus far inconclusive (Hanushek and Woessmann 2014), which
have hitherto prevented the identification of the optimal model of educational man-
agement (public versus private).
In this context, our study makes a further contribution to this controversial issue.
Its main aim is to provide new evidence on the topic from the Spanish experience.4
Our study’s idiosyncrasy lies in the methodological way that it follows to deal with
the empirical challenges overshadowing our estimates. Indeed, this is the first study in
3 This bias has its origin in the fact that attendance at a school, whether private or public, is not random but
instead is conditioned by characteristics of the family background, which in turn are extremely important
in the determination of educational outcomes (the family socioeconomic level, for example).
4 In this sense, our paper meets Davies’ claim (2013, p. 880): “As debates over school choice become
increasingly transnational, we need studies from a variety of settings to build a stockpile of international
knowledge about school sectors and student achievement.”
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this literature, as far as we know, where the potential selection bias, in observable and
unobservable variables, and the nested structure of the dataset are jointly addressed.
Specifically, our methodological strategy is defined by the sequential application of
two methods: propensity score matching (PSM) and hierarchical linear models (HLM).
The first of these will allow us to delimit a homogenous subsample of students attending
private and public schools and to obtain an unbiased estimation of the effect of the
private management model of schools. The application of a post-matching analysis (by
means of HLM) to this subsample of students will allow us to obtain a more efficient
estimation of the effect of the private management model of schools upon the student’s
academic skills
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. The subsequent
section provides a description of the data used and the institutional setting. Section 3
outlines the methodological strategy employed to identify the effect of private schools
on educational achievement. Section 4 presents the results of our estimations. Section 5
concludes the paper with a summary of our findings.
2 Data and institutional background
One of the defining characteristics of the school system in Spain is its dual nature,
consisting predominantly of public sector provision but with a substantial private
sector. The largest segment of the latter is represented by schools publicly funded by
regional education authorities but privately owned and run. This school model arose in
1985 through the Right to Education Act—LODE—where the families right to school
choice was acknowledged for the first time [for a detailed description and historical
evolution of the Spanish non-higher education system, see Bernal (2005)].
The distribution of students enrolled in primary education among different school
types in Spain in 2010 was as follows: 67.4% of students attended a public school,
28.5% a state-funded and privately run school and 4.1% completely private inde-
pendent schools (Spanish Ministry of Education 2013). This situation is practically
identical for the region of Aragón, which constitutes the main core of our study, where
these percentages are 67.5, 29.5 and 3.0%, respectively. A detailed explanation of
the differences between Spanish public and private schools is offered by Green et al.
(2014).
Our empirical study employs census data for students in the fourth grade in the
Spanish region of Aragón in 2010. These data come from the Evaluación de Diag-
nóstico (ED), a national assessment of the educational skills of fourth grade pupils
established by the Spanish Education Act (LOE) in 2006 (hereinafter we refer to our
database as 2010 Aragón ED). This regional perspective permits a more appropri-
ate comparison between private and public schools in terms of the region’s funding,
governance arrangements and student populations. Data were provided by the Aragón
Educational Authority, which is responsible for the implementation of the Assessment
in its district.
The ED is involved in the evaluation of several educational competencies that rotate
every 2 years: Spanish, Maths, Science, Digital Skills, Foreign Language, Social Inter-
action and Citizenship, Art, Learning by Oneself and Personal Autonomy. In 2010,
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the second year of the application of the ED, the competencies evaluated were sci-
ence and foreign language (English). In addition to the assessment of pupils’ skills,
the ED includes data on a wide range of students’ characteristics. These include
basic demographics (gender, age, immigration status, etc.), information on children’s
socioeconomic backgrounds (parents’ occupational status, parents’ years of school-
ing, household possessions, etc.), data on the academic profile of students (if the child
has repeated any academic year, if he or she needs help in doing homework, the daily
time devoted to study, etc.) and data on parents’ involvement in education, on students’
perceptions of themselves and the class environment and on students’ satisfaction with
the school.
Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics of all the variables drawn from the 2010
Aragón ED, grouped by school type (public and private schools). As it shows, raw
results are higher for private school students (in both science and foreign language—
English).5 But raw differences are insufficient to judge the relative quality of public
versus private schools because they do not take into account the differences between
students attending each type of school, which are very important. As shown in Table 1,
students’ academic potential in private schools is much greater than in public schools.
Further, this pattern holds for variables such as parents’ occupational status, parents’
years of schooling, household possessions, the immigration status of pupils, parents’
involvement in education, students’ motivation and so on. These differences between
public and private schools are almost all statistically significant, a result which mirrors
the conclusions reached by other studies which have analysed this topic in Spain, using
distinct databases (Mancebón et al. 2012; Doncel et al. 2012) .6
3 Research strategy
When evaluating the impact of the self-governing management model of private
schools on students’ educational outcomes, it is important to take into considera-
tion certain empirical features that challenge observational studies addressing this
question. In our specific case, the main methodological challenge to overcome stems
from the fact that, as shown in Table 1, the distribution of students between schools
in the region of Aragón (as in the rest of Spain) is not random. This is due to the fact
that schools are freely chosen by families (LODE 1985). Among other influences,
family socioeconomic characteristics have been proven to be one of the main determi-
nants of the selection pattern in Spain (Escardibul and Villarroya 2009; Mancebón and
Ximénez-de-Embún 2014), being private schools chosen mainly by families belonging
5 The average score of each competence for the total number of schools is 500 and the standard deviation
100, given that as established by the General Report on Diagnostic Evaluation in Aragón 2010 “the evaluation
of each competence in Aragón as a whole is established at the level of the average scores transformed into
a reference value which has been fixed at 500, with a standard deviation of 100.” Here, the approach of the
Spanish Diagnostic Evaluation is similar to that of the evaluations of the PISA Project of the OECD. In
Table 1, the average score differs from 500 due to the elimination from the sample of completely private
independent schools and of those situated in municipalities in which there exists no choice between public
and private schools.
6 Escardibul and Villarroya (2009) and Mancebón and Ximénez-de-Embún (2014) offer some suggestions
to cope with these inequalities in the distribution of students between public and private schools.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics grouped by school type. Source: Authors’ calculations, from 2010 Aragón
ED (Aragón Regional Education Authority)
Description variable Mean Difference
Total Public Private (Private–public)
Outcomes
Science: Achievement in
Science
512.37 501.97 526.27 24.30***
Foreign language:
Achievement in foreign
language (English)
513.02 499.18 531.50 32.32***
Individual
Gender (female = 1,
male = 0)
0.49 0.49 0.48 −0.01
Student has repeated one or
more academic years
(repeater = 1,
non-repeater = 0)
0.08 0.09 0.06 −0.03***
Involvement in education
2-h study every day 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.02
More than 2-h study every
day
0.48 0.48 0.48 0.00
Student needs help in
homework
0.22 0.22 0.22 0.00
Parents do not check either
diary or homework
0.21 0.23 0.19 −0.04***
Parents check diary but not
homework
0.10 0.07 0.13 0.06***
Parents check homework
but not diary
0.16 0.20 0.12 −0.08***
Parents check both diary
and homework
0.53 0.50 0.57 0.07***
Private tutoring 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.01
Attitude: Student always
finishes homework
0.93 0.92 0.94 0.02*
Aptitude Student answers
homework correctly
0.85 0.84 0.87 0.03***
Household1: socioeconomic
and cultural characteristics
Mother white collar highly
skilled
0.29 0.24 0.37 0.13***
Mother white collar low
skilled
0.41 0.42 0.39 −0.03*
Mother blue collar high
skilled
0.04 0.04 0.03 −0.01***
Mother blue collar low
skilled
0.26 0.30 0.21 −0.09***
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Table 1 continued
Description variable Mean Difference
Total Public Private (Private–public)
Father white collar high
skilled
0.39 0.31 0.49 0.18***
Father white collar low
skilled
0.25 0.26 0.23 −0.03*
Father blue collar high
skilled
0.30 0.35 0.23 −0.12***
Father blue collar low
skilled
0.06 0.07 0.05 −0.02***
Education mother (years) 11.45 10.77 12.35 1.58***
Education father (years) 11.45 10.79 12.33 1.54***
Student born in Spain 0.87 0.84 0.91 0.07***
Student born in Africa 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.01***
Student born in Asia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Student born in Europe 0.05 0.06 0.03 −0.03***
Student born in Latin
America
0.05 0.06 0.04 −0.02***
Student born in an Arab
country
0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.01***
More than 5 years living in
Spain
0.94 0.93 0.95 0.02***
Number of TVs at home 2.11 2.08 2.15 0.07***
Number of computers at
home
1.55 1.49 1.63 0.14***
Number of pay TVs at
home
0.44 0.43 0.46 0.03
Number of video games at
home
1.73 1.66 1.82 0.16***
Number of MP4s at home 1.01 0.93 1.11 0.18***
Household 2: educational
Resources and their use
More than 100 books at
home
0.54 0.50 0.60 0.10***
Student uses books
frequently
0.72 0.70 0.75 0.05***
Student has own room to
study
0.95 0.94 0.96 0.02***
Internet at home 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.04***
N (students) 6724 3845 2879
N (schools) 205 124 81
T test equality of means: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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to better socioeconomic status than those that select public schools. The “school type”
predictor is therefore an endogenous variable, which gives rise to correlations between
this predictor and the residuals of the regressions, creating OLS-biased estimates.7
On the other hand, our database have a hierarchical structure, as the sample selection
of individuals in 2010 Aragon ED occurs at two levels (student and school); that is
data are clustered. Because of this, some of the characteristics of students attending
the same school are correlated, which violates the hypothesis of independence of the
observations.
The two characteristics mentioned above are the basis for our empirical strategy.
This consists of a two-step procedure.
Firstly, a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis is conducted. This allows us
to define a homogenous student subsample in terms of the observable characteristics
that may jointly influence both the selection of school type and educational scores. In
this way, we will manage to correct the endogeneity problem affecting the predictor
of our interest (i.e., type of school) and to obtain an unbiased estimate of the average
effect of attending a self-governing private school (average treatment effect or ATE8).
In addition, our study also controls for the impact of unobservable variables on results.
To do this, a sensitivity analysis is employed. One of the benefits of matching is that it
produces lower variance in the estimates and remains more robust to departures from
assumptions than model-based methods used on random samples (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1985; Rubin and Thomas 2000).
Secondly, a post-matching analysis is undertaken. With this second step, we intend
to improve the performance of the ATE supplied by the PSM, by cleaning up the small
residual covariance imbalance between the groups and/or improving precision (Stuart
2010). Certainly, by including in a regression all those variables that influence the
outcomes, the residual variance is reduced, which in turn lowers the standard error of
the estimates. Hence, the post-matching analysis provides us with an opportunity to
increase precision, which is very important because greater precision brings increased
statistical power (Murname and Willett 2011).9
7 The key point is that these characteristics are also chief determinants of educational outcomes. This cir-
cumstance is the cause underlying the self-selection bias problem threatening our estimates. Selection bias
and/or endogeneity are widespread in educational research and is the main methodological problem encoun-
tered when trying to evaluate the effect of private schools on the academic performance of children (Lefebvre
et al. 2011). This is a methodological problem inherent in all impact evaluations in non-experimental studies
(such as 2010 Aragón ED).
8 The most common estimands in non-experimental studies are the “average effect of the treatment on
the treated” (ATT), which is the effect for those in the treatment group, and the “average treatment effect”
(ATE), which is the effect on all individuals (treatment and control). Our focus of interest is to measure
the expected effect on the outcome if individuals in the population were randomly assigned to treatment
being this what is exactly captured by the ATE (Austin 2011). This parameter allows us to know what the
performance of the Spanish students would be if they attended a self-governing private school.
9 Such as Imbens (2004, p. 11) states when he refers to the combination of methods to estimate ATE “The
motivation for these combinations is that although in principle any one of these methods can remove all
of the bias associated with the covariates, combining two may lead to more robust inference. For example,
matching leads to consistent estimators for average treatment effects under weak conditions, so matching
and regression can combine some of the desirable variance properties of regression with the consistency of
matching.”
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For this post-matching analysis, a multilevel equation model (HLM) is estimated.
This allows us to cope with the clustered structure of the data supplied by the 2010
Aragón ED. This model, applied to the subsample defined thorough PSM, permits
differentiation between those influences affecting at different levels: student, class
and school.
4 Empirical results
This section presents the principal results obtained from the empirical analysis
performed. Firstly, the estimations obtained from the application of the PSM are com-
mented upon. Next, we present the principal contributions to these estimations offered
by the application of the HLM.
4.1 PSM results
4.1.1 Estimation of the propensity score model
The purpose of PSM is to proxy a credible value of the counterfactual for each of the
individuals belonging to the treatment group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In our
case, this consist of finding a group of students from public schools (control group
or CG) which is comparable with the students who attend a private school (treatment
group or TG) in all those variables X which can potentially condition both the choice
of school and the scores obtained in the 2010 Aragón ED.
The principal advantage of the PSM resides in its capacity to perform matchings
between the treated and non-treated individuals when the number of covariates (X)
is numerous (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). This is because matchings are performed
upon a single magnitude, the propensity score, which synthesizes all the information
contained in the X control variables. The propensity score was defined by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) to be the conditional probability of assignment to treatment given
covariates,10 i.e:
e(x) = P(Z = 1|X) (1)
where e(X) is the propensity score, Z is the indicator of participation in treatment
(treatment group Z = 1 and control group Z = 0) and X are the observable charac-
teristics of individuals.
The propensity score is a balancing score: conditional on the propensity score, the
distribution of measured baseline covariates is similar between treated and untreated
individuals. The propensity score exists in both randomized experiments and obser-
vational studies. In randomized experiments, the true propensity score is known and
is defined by the study design. In observational studies, the true propensity score is
not known. However, it can be estimated using the study data (Austin 2011).
10 The assumption of selection on observables requires that conditional on the observed variables, the
assignment to treatment is random.
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Econometric literature offer various methods of estimation of the conditional prob-
ability of receiving a treatment (Guo and Fraser 2010). In practice, the propensity
score is most often estimated using a logistic regression model, in which treatment
status is regressed on observed baseline characteristics. Other proposed methods to
estimate the propensity score are: bagging or boosting (McCaffrey et al. 2004), recur-
sive partitioning or tree-based methods (Lee et al. 2010), random forests (Lee et al.
2010), neural networks (Setoguchi et al. 2008) and series logit estimator (Hirano et al.
2003). In our study, we use a generalized boosted model (GBM).11 In this model,
the analyst does not need to specify functional forms of the predictor variables. In
addition, GBM permits nonlinear and interaction effects to be captured (McCaffrey
et al. 2004). Finally, the data-adaptive algorithm on which this method is grounded
leads to estimations of the propensity score that balance the observable covariates of
the treatment and control group, which is a very valuable feature of GBM when it is
used in the context of PSM. For all these reasons, GBM constitutes a highly suitable
model to be used in the context of the PSM (Chowa et al. 2013).
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of equation 1 (selection equation).12 It
can be observed that the variables which capture the greatest degree of influence in the
probability of attending a Spanish private school are the years of study of the father
and mother (21 and 16%, respectively), followed by the variables which proxy the
degree of possessions in the household (number of TVs, PCs, video game consoles,
MP4s, study room). The influence of the employment of the parents is also important.
The dummies which approximate the employment of the mother account for 5.7%
and those of the father 10.6%. More qualified occupations lead to an increase in the
probability of attending a private school.
At the bottom of Table 2, several measures of the goodness of fit of the model
are showed. This is because when using categorical dependent variables, it is difficult
to evaluate the overall fit of the estimated model (Rehm 2005, p. 19). Pseudo-R2
for the train and test samples and the percentage of correctly predicted observations
(PCP) are reported on Table 2. Although PCP reaches practically 64%, it is difficult
to evaluate whether this qualifies as a “good” or a “bad” model. In any event, this
percentage shows that the model is at least more successful than a simplistic model
that trivially predicts that all observations will be a one (Rehm 2005). As PCP suffers
from various problems (Herron 1999), other additional measures have been calculated
11 We are assuming homogeneity in response across observed covariates. Lehrer and Kordas (2013) demon-
strate that when the treatment effects vary in an unsystematic manner with the true propensity score, there
are gains from using a matching algorithm based on propensity scores estimated via binary regression
quantiles.
12 In the estimation of the propensity score, only those variables that could affect both the choice of a
private school and the students’ academic performance were included (no consideration is taken of either
the variables which can potentially contribute to explaining the differences in educational outcomes but
which do not influence the choice of school, such as study habits, for example, nor those which could
be determinants of that choice but do not influence the educational skills cited, such as the distance to
the school, for example). In addition, only those variables which are potential predictors of educational
outcomes and which occur prior to the choice of school (or were stable between the time of the choice
of school and the time of the outcome assessment) were included as explanatory variables in equation 1
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Material that point out all the observables are listed in Table 1 and case-wise
deletion was used to handle missing data.
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Table 2 Results of the GBM
Variable Influence
Parents education: Father’s education (years) 21.08
Mother’s education (years) 16.02
Household possessions
Number of Videogames at home 9.36
Number of MP4s at home 8.20
Number of TVs at home 6.57
Student has own room to study 5.99
Number of PCs at home 4.51
Number PayTV at home 3.58
Parents occupation status (Reference Blue collar low skilled)
Father blue collar high skilled 2.84
Father white collar low skilled 6.76
Father white collar high skilled 1.01
Mother blue collar high skilled 1.76
Mother white collar low skilled 1.23
Mother white collar high skilled 2.73
Student born in
Spain (non-immigrant) 0.98
Africa 0.76
Asia 2.08
Europe 2.07
Latin America 0.57
Number of books 1.91
Best num iterations 16453
Train R2 0.084
Test R2 0.045
Percentage of correct predictions (PCP) 63.4%
Percentage reduction in error (PRE)b 36.2%
Expected percentage of correct predictions (ePCP)c 54.4%
Train fraction 0.5
Bag 0.5
Shrinkage factor 0.0005
Distribution Logistic
Max num interactions 4a
Max num iterations 20,000
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Table 2 continued
Variable Influence
Seed 0
Dependent variable P (Z = 1)
aMcCaffrey et al. (2004) provides a detailed description of how GBM handles interaction terms and rec-
ommends a maximum of four splits for each simple tree used in the model, which allows all four way
interactions between all covariates to be considered for optimizing the likelihood function at each iteration.
bPRE (percentage reduction in error) is defined as the quotient (PCP−PMC)/(1−PMC), where PCP is the
percentage correctly predicted and PMC is the percentage of observations in the modal category of the
observed data. Therefore, PRE seeks to compare the information provided by probit fitted categories (PCP)
with the classification errors a researcher would make if she naively assigned all fitted categories to the
modal category (PMC).
cePCP is the expected percentage of correct predictions and is defined as the sum over all observations i of
the probability that yˆi = yi , (see equation 12 in Herron 1999)
and are shown in Table 2: the percentage of reduction in error (PRE) and the expected
percentage of correct predictions (ePCP). The final part of the table shows various
parameters used in the estimation of the GBM.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the predictions of the propensity scores esti-
mated for the individuals from public (CG) and private schools (TG). It can be clearly
observed, in the distribution graph, that there is a very broad area of common support.
In other words, individuals in the treatment group have individuals in the control group
with whom they can be compared, as their propensity scores are the same.
4.1.2 Matching and resampling estimation
After estimating the propensity score, the matching process was then undertaken.
Various algorithms can be found in the literature regarding the performance of this
process: greedy matching, optimal matching and fine balance (Guo and Fraser 2010).
The present study uses the first of these, which may be applied via a range of variants
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Fig. 1 Propensity score distribution by school type. a Full sample and b matched sample
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(Smith and Tood 2005). Concretely, our study applied nearest neighbour matching
(hereinafter NNM) and methods based on kernel functions (hereinafter KM), as well
as several of the options permitted by NNM (with and without replacement, with
caliper and without caliper, 1 to 1, 1 to 2 and 1 to 3).13 The KM was applied with
different bandwidths. This was done in an attempt to test the sensitivity of the matching
to the different estimation methods.14
Here, we present the results from estimations of the Epanechnikov kernel type KM
with a bandwidth of 0.03, since this was the algorithm that best matched the individuals
from both the treatment group and the control group.15 The sample was only reduced
by 9 individuals from the control group who were not paired with any individual from
the treatment group. The remaining individuals from the control group were weighted
on the basis of the number of times that they were matched with treated individuals.
These weights are required to be used in the subsequent statistical analyses.
All the previous analysis permit us to be confident about the quality or our matching
as they show the fulfilment of one of the key assumptions in PSM applications: overlap
or common support.16
Having selected the subsample of comparable individuals, the following step in
the PSM is to calculate the matching estimator of the average treatment effect (ATE).
We apply the psmatch2 module in Stata to obtain the ATE.17 Results are displayed in
Table 3 (column 2) for science and foreign language (English). It shows that private
schools have a positive and statistically significant effect on both science and foreign
language (English) scores for students evaluated in 2010 Aragón ED.
13 The first of these (NNM) matches each treated individual with that non-treated individual having the most
similar propensity score value. This is to say, in nearest neighbour matching, Stata selects the control(s)
nearest to each treated observation for comparison. KM constructs matches using all the individuals in
the potential control sample in such a way that it gathers more information from those who are closer
matches and less from distant observations. In so doing, KM uses comparatively more information than
other matching algorithms (Guo and Fraser 2010, chapter 7).
14 We applied the coarsened exact matching as a robustness technique obtaining worse results in terms of
similarity between treatment and control groups generated. Results are available upon request.
15 Results supplied by the different matching estimation methods led to similar conclusions. They are not
supplied here but are available from the authors upon request.
16 Other results devoted to test the matching quality are shown in Appendix. In particular, Table 5 shows
the differences in the average values of propensity scores and covariates for the whole sample and the
paired sample. The last two rows in this table show the median absolute standardized bias (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1985) before and after matching. As can be inferred, KM has reduced covariate imbalance on all
variables. Figure 2 shows graphically the pre- and post-matching bias for each of the variables included in
the estimation of the propensity score. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of these same variables by type of
school for the complete sample (figures on the left) and the matched sample (figures on the right).
17 This command calculates the ATE as a weighted average of the ATT (average effect on treated) and the
ATU (average effect on untreated). This is a very common definition of the ATE in the literature (see for
instance, Böckerman et al. 2013; Gangl 2014). An alternative way to calculate the ATE is by weighting
observations by the inverse of the calculated propensities scores (Hirano et al. 2003). In order to check
the robustness of the ATE, we also calculated it applying this last method, i.e., using the propensities as
sampling weights. For this, we used the Stata’s teffects module. Results are similar to those shown in Table 3
and are available upon request.
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Table 3 Average treatment effect of private schools
Scores ATE S.E. T-stat
Science 10.65*** 2.43 4.39
Foreign language
(English)
13.69*** 2.38 5.76
Matching algorithm used is an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.03
ATE standard errors corrected by bootstrapping (nrep=1000)
***p value = 0.000
4.1.3 Sensitivity analysis: selection on unobservables
The main issue with cross-sectional matching analysis is that there may be a problem
of hidden bias due to the effect of selection on unobserved heterogeneity and any
positive association between a pupil’s treatment status and test score outcomes may
not represent a causal effect (Bradley et al. 2013). To deal with this problem, we
perform a sensitivity analysis which allows us to evaluate to what extent our results
are robust to a potential imbalance in the unobservable factors (Altonji et al. 2008;
Peel 2014, among others).
We apply the Rosenbaum’s (2002) procedure for bounding the treatment effect
estimates. There we give the results of the p value from Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for
the ATE while setting the level of hidden bias to a certain value γ , which reflects our
assumption about unmeasured heterogeneity or endogeneity in treatment assignment
(expressed in terms of the odds ratio of differential treatment assignment due to an
unobserved covariate).18 At each γ , we calculate a hypothetical significance level “p
value critical,” which represents the bound on the significance level of the treatment
effect in the case of endogenous self-selection into treatment status.
Table 4 shows that robustness to hidden bias varies across the two variables. The
finding of a positive effect of private management on science is the least robust to the
possible presence of selection bias. The critical level of γ at which we would have to
question our conclusion of a positive effect is between 1.12 and 1.15, i.e., it is attained
if an unobserved covariate caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ
between treatment and control cases by a factor of about 1.15. For foreign language
model, it would require a hidden bias of γ between 1.30 and 1.33 to render spurious
the conclusion of a positive benefit effect on “private school”.19
A critical value of 1.15 suggests that individuals with the same X -vector differ in
their odds of participation by a factor of 1.15 or 15%. It is important to note that these
are worst-case scenarios. Hence, a critical value of 1.15 does not mean that unobserved
heterogeneity exists and that there is no effect of treatment on the outcome variable.
This result only states that the confidence interval for the effect would include zero
if an unobserved variable caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ
18 For a mathematical demonstration, see DiPrete and Gangl (2004).
19 In addition, we calculated the Hodges–Lehmann point estimates and its confidence intervals obtaining
the same critical values.
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Table 4 Rosenbaum bounds for management benefit treatment effects
Variable γ a P value critical
Science 1 8.5e−07
(N = 2879 matched pairs) 1.03 .000021
1.06 .000296
1.09 .002644
1.12 .015351
1.15 .060581
1.18 .169812
1.21 .353833
1.24 .575602
Foreign language (English) 1 2.6e−15
(N = 2879 matched pairs) 1.03 4.7e−13
1.06 4.8e−11
1.09 2.8e−09
1.12 9.8e−08
1.15 2.2e−06
1.18 .000031
1.21 .000306
1.24 .002087
1.27 .010261
1.30 .037393
1.33 .103961
agamma: log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors
between treatment and comparison groups by 1.15. Moreover, this variable’s effect
on the outcome would have to be so strong that it almost perfectly determines the
outcome in each pair of matched cases in the data. However, even if there is unobserved
heterogeneity to a degree of 15% in the group of science, the inference about the
treatment effect would not be changed.
To repeat, the Rosenbaum bounds are in this sense a “worst-case” scenario.
Nonetheless, they convey important information about the level of uncertainty con-
tained in matching estimators by showing just how large the influence of a confounding
variable must be to undermine the conclusions of a matching analysis.20
20 Additionally, we test our estimation with another sensitivity analysis proposed by Ichino et al. (2008) This
consists in calculating the ATE under different possible scenarios of deviation of conditional independence
assumption (CIA). To do so, the authors impose values to parameters that characterize the U distribution in
order to simulate the ability to generate bias in the unobservable and recalculate the parameter value with
the inclusion of the influence of simulated unobserved variable. Results are available upon request. This
approach has been widely used in the literature (Binder and Coad 2013; Caliendo and Künn 2015, among
others). Others types of sensitivity analysis have been proposed in the literature. For example Altonji et al.
(2005) applied a similar idea to the Heckman selection model.
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In conclusion, this analysis allows confirm that only a large amount of unob-
served heterogeneity would alter the inference about the estimated effects. Even so,
as suggested by Lee and Lee (2009), it is always advisable to be very cautious when
interpreting the results.
4.2 Post-matching analysis: HLM results
The application of the PSM has permitted us to obtain an unbiased estimation of
the ATE with regard to the observable variables (X ) which distinguish the members
of the treatment and the control groups and which are potentially important in the
determination of outcomes (Y ).
However, the potential influences on the educational outcome include, usually, more
variables than those that simultaneously influence attendance to a private school, that is
to say those considered in the construction of the propensity score. Given this situation,
the calculation of a more robust effect of an intervention in the educational context
requires the contrast of the influence of those other factors
(
X ′
)
which are potentially
important in the determination of Y but do not influence school choice. For this, it
is fundamental to carry out a post-matching analysis. Two types of influence deserve
attention: the characteristics of the schools at which individuals are educated and the
attributes of the students not incorporated into the calculation of the propensity score
(those contemporary to the receipt of the treatment).
The testing of the importance of these two characteristics can be performed via a
regression model on the matched sample. Of all the available regression models, the
HLMs adapt best to the peculiarities of our dataset.21 Their main advantage is that they
permit differentiation between those influences acting at the student level (first level
of analysis) and those acting at the class and school level (second and third levels).22
They are, therefore, models which are especially appropriate for working with data
nested at various levels, such as those supplied by almost all educational databases,
including 2010 Aragón ED.23
21 HLM are similar to OLS concerning the way in which they weigh the observations (see Yitzhaki 1996
for a discussion of OLS weights). Both weigh the observations differently to PSM. We are grateful to an
anonymous referee for making this point. In any case, our purpose with the HLM is not to compare the
ATE that it supplies with that obtained via PSM.
22 Multilevel models, such as HLM, are built on the Moulton’s (1990) work of clustering. The insight
provided by Moulton’s work was that when individuals within the aggregated level are clustered, so that
they are in fact more similar to one another than individuals belonging to another cluster group, the OLS
assumption that observations are independent and identically distributed is violated. For this reason, the
estimation by OLS can result in a downward bias in the estimated standard errors of estimates leading the
analyst to conclude the aggregate level effects are statistically significant when they are in fact not. Multilevel
models have the benefit of allowing for partial pooling of coefficients towards the completely pooled OLS
estimate which according to Gelman (2006) can be a more effective estimation strategy. Simulations using
a dataset with students clustered within classrooms and classrooms within schools suggest that modelling
the clustering of the data using a multilevel method is a better approach than clustering the standard errors
of OLS estimate (Cheah 2009).
23 Bryk and Raudenbusch (1988) recommend the use of this type of general model when analysing the
effects of schools on educational outcomes. There exist multiple applications of this methodology to the
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Table 8 in Appendix shows the results of the application of HLM to the matched
sample.24 The dependent variables in the regression are the scores in science and
foreign language (English). The left-hand side of the table presents the results from
the two-level model for foreign language (English). The right-hand side offers the
results for the three-level model, which is more adequate for the estimation of the
determinants of the outcomes in science. The models were estimated by imposing
fixed effects on the parameters (with the exception of the independent term), after
rejecting the null hypothesis that there existed statistically significant random effects.
The predictor which has greatest interest in our study is attendance at a private
school. It can be observed that this effect is positive and significant both for science
and foreign language (English). The coefficient estimated in science is 23.53 points,
equivalent to two-tenths of the standard deviation (0.23), which corresponds to a small
level size (Cohen 1988). Similarly, the value of the coefficient estimated in foreign
language (English) is small (0.2 points of the standard deviation).
5 Conclusions
This paper has carried out an evaluation of the effectiveness of an educational pol-
icy that has been widely applied under different guises worldwide: public funding of
privately owned and run schools. Empirical studies devoted to evaluating the impact
of this educational intervention have expanded notably over the last 2 decades using
different methodological approaches. However, results of this research remain incon-
clusive. Our work contributes to this literature providing new evidence from the
Spanish experience. Our methodological strategy has been guided by our database’s
empirical features: (a) non-random distribution of students between Spanish private
and public schools and (b) clustered data. These two characteristics led us to apply, in
the first step, a propensity score-matching analysis that permitted us to define a homo-
geneous subsample of students attending public and private schools. In the second
step, we estimated the impact of attending to a publicly funded privately run school
by means of a hierarchical linear model that allowed us to cope with the clustered
structure of our database.
The analysis performed in this study has underlined the existence of a slight and
significant advantage in performance of the self-governing model of private schools
educational context. Among these are Willms (2006), Somers et al. (2004) and Mancebón et al. (2012), the
last of these being applied to Spanish data from PISA 2006.
24 Previously to the estimation of the HLM, we evaluated the appropriateness of applying it to our data.
For this, we calculated the intra-class correlation (ICC) values of the null model of science and foreign
language (English) performance (the two being the dependent variables of the regression). If the ICC were
zero, a hierarchical model would not be necessary, since in this case the total variance of the scores would
not be explained by the differences existing between students attending different classes or schools. Results
of these calculations for an HLM at two levels and three levels are offered in Appendix (Tables 6 and 7).
These results (which show that the class level explains a small percentage of the variance of the results in
foreign language (English), but does explain a higher percentage of the results in science) leads us to apply a
two-level model for achievement in a foreign language (English) and a three-level model for science. At any
rate, results for three-level model for English and two-level model for science lead to the same conclusions
and are available upon request.
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in the region of Aragón (Spain). As the main difference between the Spanish private
and public schools in our sample is the way in which they are run, our results point to
a slight superiority of autonomy against centralization in the management of primary
schools.
At any rate, we cannot lose sight of the magnitude of the effect of self-governing
private schools on students’ abilities is quite low (a little over a 2% of a standard
deviation) which puts our work very close to those studies where no effect of privately
run schools has been found. The results coming from such a diversity of studies on the
topic (different countries, methodological approaches, type of schools and outcomes)
might be actually pointing that the model of schools’ management (public or private) is
not a key factor in the explanation of the elusive concept of school quality. Concerning
this last topic, what our estimations from the HLM have shown (see Tables 6 and 7 in
Appendix) is that school itself matters for students’ outcomes, a result in concordance
with the international evidence on education production functions (Hanushek and
Woessmann 2014). The most robust conclusion of this literature to date is that the
influence of schools does not occur though traditional inputs and that the discovery
of relevant inputs of school quality remains a true Gordian knot. This is an important
result as it points to the necessity of further research inside the black box of schools. In
our opinion, the focus should be reoriented to obtain new indicators that truly capture
the essence of what is occurring inside the classroom.
Appendix
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and Figs. 2 and 3.
Table 5 Average differences based on school type for the variables in the pre- and post-matching samples
and bias reduction
Variable Mean % Bias % Reduct t test
Treated Control |Bias| t p > |t|
Propensity score Unmatched 0.47 0.40 60.8 24.87 0.00
Matched 0.47 0.47 0.9 98.5 0.32 0.75
Mother white
collar high
skilled
Unmatched 0.37 0.24 29.7 12.15 0.00
Matched 0.37 0.37 0.7 97.6 0.26 0.80
Mother white
collar low
skilled
Unmatched 0.39 0.42 − 5.4 − 2.20 0.03
Matched 0.39 0.40 − 2.0 62.5 − 0.77 0.44
Mother blue collar
high skilled
Unmatched 0.03 0.04 − 7.6 − 3.06 0.00
Matched 0.03 0.03 − 1.7 77.5 − 0.71 0.48
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Table 5 continued
Variable Mean % Bias % Reduct t test
Treated Control |Bias| t p > |t|
Mother blue collar
low skilled
Unmatched 0.21 0.30 − 21.7 − 8.74 0.00
Matched 0.21 0.20 2.3 89.6 0.93 0.36
Father white collar
high skilled
Unmatched 0.49 0.31 36.7 14.98 0.00
Matched 0.49 0.50 − 1.2 96.8 − 0.44 0.66
Father white collar
low skilled
Unmatched 0.23 0.26 − 6.5 − 2.61 0.01
Matched 0.23 0.24 − 2.0 68.8 − 0.77 0.44
Father blue collar
high skilled
Unmatched 0.23 0.35 − 27.5 − 11.07 0.00
Matched 0.23 0.21 3.4 87.8 1.38 0.17
Father blue collar
low skilled
Unmatched 0.05 0.07 − 10.7 − 4.29 0.00
Matched 0.05 0.05 − 0.3 97.2 − 0.13 0.90
Mother’s
education
(years)
Unmatched 12.34 10.78 33.9 13.66 0.00
Matched 12.34 12.49 − 3.2 90.7 − 1.26 0.21
Father’s education
(years)
Unmatched 12.34 10.78 33.5 13.53 0.00
Matched 12.34 12.47 − 2.9 91.4 − 1.13 0.26
Student born in
Spain
Unmatched 0.91 0.84 21.0 8.36 0.00
Matched 0.91 0.91 0.9 95.8 0.38 0.70
Student born in
Africa
Unmatched 0.00 0.01 − 9.3 − 3.65 0.00
Matched 0.00 0.00 1.0 89.4 0.60 0.55
Student born in
Asia
Unmatched 0.01 0.01 − 1.0 − 0.42 0.68
Matched 0.01 0.00 2.1 − 101.6 0.89 0.37
Student born in
Europe
Unmatched 0.03 0.06 − 12.8 − 5.11 0.00
Matched 0.03 0.04 − 2.5 80.9 − 1.06 0.29
Student born in
Latin America
Unmatched 0.04 0.06 − 10.9 − 4.36 0.00
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.2 97.8 0.10 0.92
Student born in
Arab country
Unmatched 0.01 0.02 − 8.1 − 3.19 0.00
Matched 0.01 0.01 − 0.7 91.8 − 0.30 0.76
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Table 5 continued
Variable Mean % Bias % Reduct t test
Treated Control |Bias| t p > |t|
Number of books
at home
Unmatched 0.60 0.50 18.7 7.56 0.00
Matched 0.60 0.61 − 2.0 89.4 − 0.76 0.45
Student has own
room to study
Unmatched 0.96 0.94 8.1 3.23 0.00
Matched 0.96 0.96 − 1.2 84.9 − 0.51 0.61
Internet at home Unmatched 0.88 0.84 12.7 5.06 0.00
Matched 0.88 0.89 − 3.4 73.4 − 1.40 0.16
Number of TVs at
home
Unmatched 2.15 2.08 9.8 3.96 0.00
Matched 2.15 2.15 0.8 92.1 0.30 0.77
Number of PCs at
home
Unmatched 1.63 1.49 17.2 6.97 0.00
Matched 1.63 1.66 − 4.1 76.2 − 1.56 0.12
Number of pay
TVs at home
Unmatched 0.46 0.43 4.5 1.82 0.07
Matched 0.46 0.48 − 3.4 24.1 − 1.24 0.21
Number of video
games at home
Unmatched 1.82 1.66 16.3 6.62 0.00
Matched 1.82 1.84 − 1.9 88.6 − 0.71 0.48
Number of MP4s
at home
Unmatched 1.11 0.93 18.3 7.47 0.00
Matched 1.11 1.14 − 3.0 83.4 − 1.11 0.27
Abs (bias) Unmatched 17.7 617.20 0.00
Matched 1.9 31.47 0.09
−20 0 20 40 60
Standardized % bias across covariates
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Fig. 2 Pre- and post-matching bias between public versus private schools standardized
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Fig. 3 Distribution of the variables in the unmatched and matched samples
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Table 6 HLM regression: random effects (3-levels)
Science Foreign language (English)
Null Complete Null Complete
model model model model
Schools 1765.68 1563.41 3127.05 2199.61
Classes 1261.67 1139.06 462.25 543.82
Students 5635.50 3923.77 5136.59 3462.15
Total 8662.86 6626.24 8725.89 6205.58
ICC (school) 20.4% 35.8%
ICC (class) 14.6% 5.3%
% of total variance
explained by variables
23.5% 28.9%
% of level 1 (students)
variance explained by
variables
30.4% 32.6%
% of level 2 (classes)
variance explained by
variables
9.7% −17.6%
% of level 3 (schools)
variance explained by
variables
11.5% 29.7%
Table 7 HLM regression: random effects (2-levels)
Science Foreign language (English)
Null Complete Null Complete
model model model model
Schools 2625.54 2264.81 3386.08 2418.67
Students 6160.68 4403.65 5333.38 3688.13
Total 8786.22 6668.46 8719.46 6106.81
ICC (schools) 29.9% 38.8%
% of total variance
explained by variables
24.1% 30.0%
% of level 1 (students)
variance explained by
variables
28.5% 30.8%
% of level 2 (schools)
variance explained by
variables
13.7% 28.6%
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Table 8 Estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors in the HLM
Two-level model Three-level model
Foreign language (English) Science
Variable Coeff. Variable Coeff.
School variables (Level 2) School variables (Level 3)
Intercept 368.63*** Intercept 507.46***
(35.3) (46.31)
Private school 20.65*** Private school 23.53***
(7.81) (7.93)
TERUEL provincea 9.91 TERUEL provincea 2.03
Ref: Huesca province (16.29) Ref: Huesca province (16.32)
ZARAGOZA provincea 6.03 ZARAGOZA provincea −11.61
Ref: Huesca province (15.06) Ref: Huesca province (15.29)
Municipality size 1.2*** Municipality size −0.05
(inhabitants in thousands) (0.44) (inhabitants in thousands) (0.44)
ZARAGOZA city −776.9 ZARAGOZA city 11.9
(290.29) (287.66)
Class variables (Level 2)
Percentage girls at school 14.66 Percentage girls in class −30.65
(16.83) (24.91)
Percentage repeaters at school 36.21 Percentage repeaters in class −21.12
(25.93) (38.88)
Percentage of pupils living
over 5 years in Spain at school
at school
5.28 Percentage of pupils living
over than 5 years in Spain at
school in class
0.13
(27.33) (39.03)
Percentage of students whose
mother is white collar high
skilled at school
9.33 Percentage of students whose
mother is white collar high
skilled in class
−21.71
(18.38) (28.76)
Percentage of students whose
mother is white collar low
skilled at school
21.81 Percentage of students whose
mother is white collar low
skilled at class
−14.76
(15.61) (24.43)
Percentage of students whose
mother is blue collar high
skilled at school
−2.78 Percentage of students whose
mother is blue collar high
skilled in class
−94.98
(36.19) (57.4)
Average number of years of
mothers education at school
4.84*** Average number of years of
mothers’ education ins class
1.25
(1.56) (2.29)
Student variables (Level 1) Student variables (Level 1)
Female student 20.15*** Female student −11.83
(2.31) (2.41)
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Table 8 continued
Two-level model Three-level model
Foreign language (English) Science
Variable Coeff. Variable Coeff.
If student has repeated any
year
−40.72 If student has repeated any
year
−27.98
(5.50) (5.72)
Student’s mother is white col-
lar high skilled
11.97*** Student’s mother is white col-
lar high skilled
11.3***
(3.66) (3.82)
Student’s mother is white col-
lar low skilled
0.7 Student’s mother is white col-
lar low skilled
1.26
(3.15) (3.27)
Student’s mother is blue collar
high skilled
2.21 Student’s mother is blue collar
high skilled
1.19
(7.15) (7.44)
Pupil’s father is white collar
high skilled
9.34* Pupil’s father is white collar
high skilled
1.06
(5.65) (5.93)
Student’s father is white collar
low skilled
1.48 Student’s father is white collar
low skilled
−2.26
(5.70) (5.98)
Student’s father is blue collar
high skilled
3.21 Student’s father is blue collar
high skilled
0.76
(5.61) (5.89)
Mother’s years of education 1.31*** Mother’s years of education 1.51***
(0.31) (0.32)
Over 5 years living in Spain −7.24 Over 5 years living in Spain 18.81***
(5.64) (5.87)
Over 100 books at home 7.43*** Over 100 books at home 13.18***
(2.56) (2.7)
Student uses books frequently 13.87*** Student uses books frequently 12.99***
(2.8) (2.97)
Number of TVs at home −5.16 Number of TVs at home −6.36
(1.54) (1.62)
2 h of homework every day −3.53 2 h studying every day −10.01
(3.43) (3.63)
Over 2 h studying every day −11.95 Over 2 h studying every day −12.09
(2.62) (2.78)
Student needs help in home-
work
−23.25 Student needs help in home-
work
−27.24
(2.87) (3.02)
Parents check diary but not
homework
−2.86 Parents check diary but not
homework
−11.24
(4.4) (4.62)
Parents check homework but
not diary
−1.12 Parents check homework but
not diary
−10.69
(3.7) (3.93)
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Table 8 continued
Two-level model Three-level model
Foreign language (English) Science
Variable Coeff. Variable Coeff.
Parents check both homework
and diary
−10.83 Parents check both homework
and diary
−18.06
(3.06) (3.24)
Private tutoring −17.26 Private tutoring −19.68
(4.18) (4.41)
Student Attitude (Student
always finishes homework)
9.78* Student Attitude (Student
always finishes homework)
16.46***
(5.26) (5.57)
Student Aptitude (Student
answers homework correctly)
11.75*** Student Aptitude (Student
answer homework correctly)
16.53***
(3.81) (4.00)
RELCENb (Factor 1) 4.58*** RELCENb (Factor 1) 0.76
(1.18) (1.26)
SELFCONFb (Factor 2) 21.63*** SELFCONFb (Factor 2) 16.13***
(1.34) (1.42)
PERCAMBb (Factor 3) −3.83 PERCAMBb (Factor 3) −7.38
(1.14) (1.24)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (calculated with R package lme4, nrep=1000)
aThis variable proxies the location of the school in the region of Aragón. This region consists of three
provinces: Zaragoza, Teruel and Huesca (this last being the category of reference)
bRELCEN contains information regarding the evaluation the child makes of his or her school (if the centre
has cultural and sports activities, if the pupil uses the school’s library, if the installations are well maintained
for, etc.). SELFCONF synthesizes the information offered by variables related to the self-perception of the
pupils’ academic capacity (if pupils understand what they read, if they express themselves well, if they write
correctly, if they are good at languages, etc.). PERCAMB, finally, reflects the subjective perceptions of the
school environment (if there is a good atmosphere in the pupil’s class, if his/her classmates help each other,
if the pupil has a good relationship with his/her teachers, if the teachers stimulate their pupils, etcetera).
These variables were obtained from a principal components analysis applied to the data concerning the
school environment. These data proceed from the answers supplied by the pupils evaluated in the 2010
Aragon ED
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